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Abstract:  The extended mind thesis claims that at least some cognitive processes extend beyond
the  organism’s  brain  in  that  they  are  constituted  by  the  organism’s  actions  on  its  surrounding
environment. A more radical move would be to claim that social actions performed by the organism
could at least constitute some of its mental processes. This can be called the socially extended mind
thesis.  Based on the notion of affordance as developed in the ecological psychology tradition, I
defend the view that perception extends into the environment. Then I will expand the notion of
affordance to encompass social affordances. Thus, perception can in some situations also be socially
extended.
Keywords: social  affordances,  extended  mind  thesis,  ecological  psychology,  social  perception,
James Gibson. 
1. Introduction
Roughly  speaking,  the  thesis  of  the  extended  mind  claims  that  at  least  some cognitive
processes extend beyond the organism’s brain in that they are constituted by actions performed by
that organism on the environment around it. Following Rowlands, I understand that thesis as being
about mental processes, not mental states (Rowlands, 2010: 8). When such actions are narrowly
construed, that is, as bodily actions, the organism’s mental processes extend to the organism’s body.
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In this sense, the embodied mind thesis is a special and limited case of the extended mind thesis.
When  the  actions  are  broadly  construed,  as  individual  actions,  the  processes  extend  to  the
environment  around the organism.  A more  radical  move would  be to  claim that  social  actions
performed by the organism could at least constitute some of its mental processes. In that case, the
organism and its social environment jointly constitute some mental processes of that organism. We
could call that the socially extended mind thesis.1  
Thus, the mind, understood here as a set  of mental processes,  can be extended in three
stages: from the brain to the body, from the organism as a whole to the organism’s environment, and
from the organism in its physical environment as a whole to the organism’s social environment. The
last stage is more controversial, since it is not clear how the organism can be attuned to its social
environment in order to perform a social action, which in turn has a constitutive role upon some
mental processes of that organism. It seems that an explanation is necessary for how at the same
time (1) an organism can track a social fact of its environment, and (2) that tracking can in part
constitute other mental processes of that organism. One of the aims of this chapter is to show how
these two processes can be explained based on the notion of affordance as it was developed in the
ecological psychology tradition. This notion is rich enough to give us a clear picture of how the
organism and its environment are, by virtue of their mutual interactions, coupled with each other,
bringing  about  cognitive  processes  of  an  interwoven  nature—that  is,  processes  constituted  by
elements from the organism and the environment at the same time. I will show how this notion can
be understood in order to incorporate social affordances. Upon that basis, I will make a case for the
socially extended mind thesis.2 
I begin in Section 2 with an explanation and motivation for the extended mind thesis. Then,
in Section 3, I introduce Gibson’s approach to perception and elucidate how it is closely associated
with or even implies the extended mind thesis. In Section 4, I present the theory of affordances and
discuss three positions in relation to what in the organism accounts for its possibilities for actions.
Affordances are relations between environmental features and the organism’s abilities. Finally, in
1 That thesis should not be confused with another, stronger, one, namely, the group mind thesis. The latter thesis
claims that  groups themselves  can have mental  processes  and states.  A group of  this kind is  to  be understood as
something over and above the individuals who compose that group (THEINER, 2013: 195). The socially extended mind
thesis is not a thesis about the constitution of groups as cognitive agents. It is a thesis about how the states and processes
of an individual organism depend constitutively on social factors present in its environment.
2 At the end of their seminal paper on this subject, Clark and Chalmers suggested that the thesis of socially
extended mind is tenable, but they did not defend that claim or develop it in that paper (1998: 17-8) . Instead, they
suggested that the thesis could be taken as a possible result from the fact that cognition is embedded in language. I will
defend that socially extended mind emerges earlier, in perception, even before the acquisition of language. My defense
is based on the ecological approach to perception. Another approach to the socially extended mind thesis is found in
Gallagher (2013), where is investigated how “cognition is socially extended in the legal institutional practices” (2013:
6). His main idea is that social institutions such as contracts and property are tools to accomplish certain aims and solve
certain tasks, extending and transforming our cognitive processes. 
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Section 5, based on the phenomenon of joint attention, which is a kind of social action, I extend the
notion of affordance to encompass social affordances. At least some affordances are socially shaped
and, I sustain, this implies the socially extended mind thesis. 
2. The extended mind thesis
The extended mind thesis was introduced in Clark and Chalmers’ article “The Extended
Mind” (1998), although versions of this thesis can be found in the works of  James Gibson (2015),
Michael Polanyi (2009), and Merleau-Ponty (2012), to mention just a few. In Clark and Chalmers’
original thought experiment, we are invited to imagine a person, Otto, with a severely impaired
memory, and to compare him with Inga, a person with normal memory. As the story goes, Otto
develops the ability to use a notebook to register and consult relevant facts for his daily tasks. We
should imagine that he becomes proficient with using his notebook to the point that we cannot see
any relevant functional difference between the role that his notebook plays in his ability to recover
past facts and the role that Inga’s brain areas for storing information play in her ability to remember
facts.  Both  Otto’s  notebook  and Inga’s  information-storage  capacity,  let’s  suppose,  are  equally
reliable and fluent.  Thus, by the parity principle,  if we think that Inga’s brain areas for storing
information are part of her cognitive process of remembering,  then we should think that Otto’s
notebook is part of his cognitive process of remembering. Understood this way, both play the same
role in their cognitive processes. The conclusion that Clark and Chalmers draw from this thought
experiment is that sometimes things outside the organism are parts of the cognitive system. In the
case considered, the notebook constitutes part of Otto’s cognitive process of remembering facts, so
Otto’s mind extends to his environment.
A more  mundane  and  common  example  of  the  extended  mind  thesis  comes  from  the
assimilation of tools and instruments. Take, for instance, the classical case of the blind person with a
cane, extensively discussed by Merleau-Ponty (2012: 144–46, 153–55) and others.3 What happens
when  the  blind  person  assimilates  the  use  of  a  cane  is  that  he  extends  his  power  of  tactile
perception. Initially, he feels the cane pressing the skin of his hand. However, after exploring the
world around him with the cane for a while, touching objects with it, getting familiar with its length
and weight, feeling how it absorbs the impact of different kinds of objects, how it slides on different
kinds of surfaces, the blind person begins to perceive with the cane. At this stage, the cane is no
longer  perceived  as  an  object,  but  it  has  become  an  instrument  with  which  the  blind  person
perceives the hardness, the texture and the form of the objects within his reach, as well as their
3 See, for example, Michael Polanyi (2009: 12–14) and Rowlands (2010: 196–202).
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spatial relation to himself, as being “in front,” “near,” “to the left,” and so on. He has learned to
attend to these object features and spatial relations with the cane. The process of habituation and
assimilation of an instrument turns this instrument into part of one’s own body and in this sense
expands it. As Merleau-Ponty points out, 
To habituate oneself to a hat, an automobile, or a cane is to take up residence in
them, or inversely, to make them participate within the voluminosity of one’s
own body.  Habit  expresses  the  power  we  have  of  dilating  our  being  in  the
world,  or  of  altering  our  existence  through  incorporating  new  instruments.
(Merleau-Ponty, 2012: 145)
To  habituate  to  an  instrument  involves  also  the  transformation  of  our  own  conscious
perception. In the case of the blind person, his awareness of the impact of the cane on his hand is
transformed into a sense of its end touching the objects he is exploring (Polanyi, 2009: 12). Instead
of perceiving the cane with his hand, he begins to directly perceive the objects with which the cane
is in contact; that is, he begins to perceive with his cane. At least from a phenomenological point of
view,  it  would be  completely  mistaken to  describe  this  process  of  habituation  as  involving an
inference,  an interpretation,  or a construction of an object from the bodily sensations produced
when his hand is pressed by the cane. Actually, “the pressures on the hand and the cane are no
longer given, the cane is no longer an object that the blind man would perceive, it has become an
instrument with which he perceives” (Merleau-Ponty, 2012: 154). The blind person now relies on
that new whole, constituted in part by the cane, to perceive his environment. Thus, the assimilation
of instruments has the power of transforming and extending our conscious perception. 
 This discussion on the habituation to instruments is interesting because it helps us see how
our own relation to our body is transformed to extend our power of perception. We learn to use our
bodily sensations to attend to and become aware of what is in touch with our body. For instance, we
are not normally conscious of our tactile sensations when we step on the ground; what we attend to
and perceive is the firmness of the ground, not our own foot or the skin of our foot being pressed by
the ground. Nevertheless, we can suppose that the child had to learn to use her body to attend to the
firmness of the ground at the same time she was learning to crawl and walk 4. She had to assimilate
her own body, exploring how it reacted to touching the ground and other surfaces, in order to attend
to what was around her body. At the end of this process of assimilation, she stopped being aware of
4 For  a  detailed  discussion  about  the  first  distinctions  we  normally  make  based  on  tactile  and  kinesthetic
information, see Sheets-Johnstone (2011).
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her body as an object, at least in the normal situation, and began to perceive the world around with
her  body.  Her  power  of  perception  was  extended  through  the  assimilation  of  her  own  body.
According to Polanyi, 
In all our waking moments we are relying on our awareness of contacts of our
body with things outside for attending to these things. Our own body is the only
thing  in  the  world  which  we  normally  never  experience  as  an  object,  but
experience always in terms of the world to which we are attending from our
body. It is by making this intelligent use of our body that we feel it to be our
body, and not a thing outside. (Polanyi, 2009: 15–6)
How do Clark and Chalmers’ thought experiment and these examples of habituation match
with our initial considerations of the extended mind thesis? Remember that it  was said that the
processes of an organism extends onto its environment if they are at least in part constituted by
actions performed by this organism in its environment. Rowlands spells this out in more detail. The
key  idea  is  that  those  actions  that  perform a  constitutive  role  should  in  some  way  transform
information that  is  present  in  the environment  into information available  to  that  organism in a
manner that the organism can use it to perform its cognitive tasks (Rowlands, 2010: 59). By that
transformation  the  organism  is  released  from  having  to  compute  or  infer  information  that  is
necessary or relevant for further cognition5. To summarize, a cognitive process extends the mind
onto the environment if information stored in some structures in the environment and relevant to the
task  being  solved  by  that  process  is  made  available  to  the  organism  by  its  manipulation,
exploitation, and transformation of those environmental structures. 
The process of Otto's remembering actually does extend to his notebook. His manipulation
of  the  notebook  (by  opening  it  or  searching for  the  right  page)  and then  his  exploitation  and
transformation of the information present on the page into available information (by perceiving and
then  reading,  for  example,  the  sentence  “The  Mário  Quintana  Cultural  House  is  on  Andradas
Street”)  are  part  of  the remembering process  of  Otto’s  belief  that  the Mário Quintana Cultural
House is on Andradas Street. These actions of manipulation and transformation constitute in part
the process by which Otto remembers his belief (Rowlands, 2010: 63). Because Otto’s brain areas
for storing information are damaged, he has to offload onto the environment the activities normally
5 Clark and Chalmers formulated a similar point by suggesting that the mind is extended through what they
called epistemic actions, actions that “alter the world so as to aid and augment cognitive processes such as recognition
and search” (1998, p. 8).
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carried out by the brain, such as information storing and processing. A last caveat in Otto's case is
this: In an ideal situation, Otto’s notebook is completely assimilated in that, although he needs to
read the words written on the pages of his notebook, he is aware not primarily of those words but of
what those words are about. Instead of attending to the sentences, he remembers with the sentences
that something was the case. This is similar to what happens when the blind person habituates to the
cane and begins to perceive with the cane. 
As  to  the  habituation  to  instruments,  it  will  soon  become  clearer  how  it  implies  the
transformation of information present in the environment into available information through the
discussion of affordances, the main theme of this chapter. It can be said in advance that habituation,
as  much  as  it  involves  exploitation  and  manipulation,  discloses  to  the  organism  patterns  of
information, or what Gibson calls “invariants.”
 
3. Gibson’s approach to perception
The first  thing to point out about Gibson’s approach to  perception is  that he intends to
reshape how perception is conceived and empirically studied in psychology. To better understand
his position, it will help to have a brief summary of the opposing view, which he calls the snapshot
view of perception (Gibson, 2015: xiii) and which is closely associated with the sandwich view of
the mind (Hurley, 2001: 3–4). According to the latter, sensation, cognition, and action should be
sharply  distinguished but  are  related  to  each other  in  accordance  with  the  input-output  model.
Sensations are the inputs to the cognitive system, which, in turn—after manipulating, transforming,
and processing  the  information  carried by the sensations—yields  as  outputs  representations  for
further  cognitions  or  actions.  In  this  model,  cognition,  understood  basically  as  information-
processing operations, is the filling of the sandwich. Vision, for example, is an information process
that has as inputs retinal images caused by the impact of light upon the photoreceptors in the retina
and generates as output enriched representations of the objects around.6 According to this approach,
actions do not constitute vision or participate in vision processes in any sense; vision has only to do
with processing the information coming from visual receptors. The problem that vision has to face
is the difficult problem of information-processing: at every moment the visual system receives two-
dimensional information about the light reflected by objects  in the environment and it  needs to
compute a three-dimensional representation of those objects. In order to know how vision computes
6 So, for example, in order to explain the perception of constant properties of objects, like shape and size, Rock
says that “we first must know how scenes actually are represented on the retina” (1995: 15), and Marr specifies a little
further: “in the case of human vision, the initial representation is in no doubt – it consists of arrays of image intensity
values as detected by the photoreceptors in the retina” (2010: 31).
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a three-dimensional representation at a specific time, it is necessary to determine precisely what is
the  two-dimensional  information  released  by visual  receptors  at  that  time,  for  then  it  becomes
possible to have a clear idea of the contribution that the visual system has to make to the formation
of the three-dimensional representation.7
This brings us to the snapshot view of vision. To better study vision, researchers should do
experiments with viewers in idealized situations of observation, preferably situations in which the
viewer is prevented from moving his body, head, or eyes. By this procedure, making the eye work
as if it were a photographic camera, vision scientists can isolate the information coming from the
visual receptors, “vision is simplest when the eye is held still,  as a camera has to be, so that a
picture is formed that can be transmitted to the brain” (Gibson, 2015: xiii). Looking around and
getting around are left out of the understanding of vision, as they are not crucial for the explanation
of the real task of the visual system, according to the snapshot view of perception.
For Gibson, these views of perception and cognition are misguided. His main departure
from those traditional studies on perception is rooted in the realization that before starting to study
how perception processes information8 released by the receptors, it is crucial to ask what kind of
information  can  be  found  in  the  environment  itself.  Only  then  we  are  in  a  good  position  to
investigate how the perceptual system can pick up that information. As Shaw clearly puts it, the
orientating  question  is  not  anymore  how  the  perceptual  system  can  construct  complex
representations of the environmental objects from such meager inputs, 
rather the question should be how information “stored” in the world can
be  perceptually  extracted  by  active,  investigative  creatures  in  their
relatively successful effort to survive calamity and achieve well-being.
(Shaw & Bransford, 1977: 5)
Take for instance the case of the perception of size constancy, that is, the perception of an
object as having the same size although its apparent size changes while the perceiver approaches or
7 The nature of this contribution is a matter of debate. Some claim that vision relies on hardwired information or
hardwired inductive transitions to extract those three-dimensional representation from two-dimensional information,
especially those committed to the thesis of the modularity of mind, see Fodor (1983) and Pylyshyn (2003), while others
claim that that information comes from influence of high-order cognition upon perception, as is defended by proponents
of the New Look, see Bruner and Goodman (1947).
8 I do not intend to discuss the nature of information in this paper. It is a delicate question that already has drawn
much debate. Without getting into the details, I want at least to say, following Chemero (2009: 116-120), that, taking A
and B as types of situations, a token of A carries information of a token of B if there is a regular causal connection
between the types A and B. This regular causal connection need not be lawlike; it can be the result of a convention. This
weaker notion of information is especially important for the possibility of social affordances. 
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moves away from the object. The traditional approach explains that perception as resulting from an
inference or processing that concludes the real size of the object from the information about its
apparent size and the information about the distance between the object and the perceiver. Although
it seems a simple inference, the perceptual system needs to parametrize the variable representing
size in order to compute it. Moreover, the information about the distance between the object and the
perceiver is  not given, so more processing is  necessary to obtain it.  Gibson’s approach is  very
different and simpler. First, he notes that patterning of surfaces is a gradient of surface textures, and
then he points out that the number of ground texture units that an object hides when resting on the
ground remains the same regardless the distance from the perceiver. This relation between an object
resting  on  the  ground  and  the  number  of  ground  texture  units  that  the  former  occludes  is  an
invariant, information “stored” in the environment, which can appear as such to the perceiver along
his locomotion. Thus, without having to rely on any inference, the perceiver can see the object as
constant in size over time, while he approaches or moves away from the object. As Gibson points
out, “the extracting of invariants over time is the key process to perception” (Gibson, 1967: 166). 
The  description  of  the  rich  informative  structures  present  in  the  environment  is
complemented  by  his  suggestion  that  these  structures  can  be  turned  available  to  the
perceiver/organism over time through its  movements,  explorations,  and manipulations.  This  has
consequences for how perception is conceived and studied.  Instead of focusing on static retinal
images registered in idealized situations, the visual psychologist is now invited to do experiments
focusing on the stimulus flux in the situation of ambient and ambulatory vision (Gibson, 2015: xiv)
—that is, while the perceiver turns his head and moves himself through the environment in order to
accomplish common tasks.9 Invariants emerge only in the flux generated by the interaction with the
environment, sometimes only in a long flux. We have then a new picture of the processes of the
perceptual system in which perception and action are interwoven. Action is not only crucial for
generating the stimulus flux but also contributes with information for picking up invariants in the
flux. As Gibson has noted, we use information from our motor skills to disambiguate between a
changing in the object and a changing in our spatial relation to the object (Gibson, 2015: 65–6). To
pick up an invariant, we need to distinguish it from what is varying in the stimulus flux by virtue of
our own movements. Thus, perception depends on action constitutively. 
Perception, in this new picture, is less dependent on computational processes by offloading
part of the cognition upon interactions with the environment that bring into the stimulus flux the
9 Yarbus has collected evidence that the pattern of our eyes movements is correlated to the task accomplished. In
relation to the same situation, for instance, seeing a picture, the eyes movements will have precise but different patterns ,
whether we are scanning for a type of object or judging the age of the people in the painting (1967).
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invariants that are “stored” there. Instead of computing the invariants of the environment, we make
them emerge in our stimulus flux through movement, exploration, and manipulation, and then the
work left  to  the brain  part  of  the perceptual  system is  that  of  picking up patterns  in  the  flux.
Gibson’s  approach  to  perception  implies  the  extended  mind  thesis,  but  not  without
reconceptualizing perception, action, cognition, and the relation between them. Perception is not
reduced to brain activity; rather, it involves a “whole body activities devoted to actively extracting,
isolating, or clarifying informative structure in the world” (Mace, 2015: xx). Cognition itself is
thought differently in the sense that  it  is  not seen as completely separated from action; on the
contrary,  it  is  constituted  by  action  and,  because  of  that,  it  extends  to  the  body  and  to  the
environment.  
4. Affordances
The theory of affordance is a response to the question: How does the perceptual system pick
up invariants present in the environment? According to ecological psychologists, our primordial
encounter with the world is mediated by opportunities for behavior. Thus, environmental invariants
are picked up in terms of what they afford. Being able to perceive what the invariants afford is
crucial  to controlling behavior.  During locomotion,  animals avoid obstacles,  stop before a cliff,
select  surfaces  that  will  support  their  weight,  etc.,  suggesting  that  their  behaviors  are  being
controlled by the perception of the affordances in their environment, that is, by the perception of
what they can do. As we will soon see, this is relevant to understanding how the environment can
have meaningful features, maybe even socially meaningful features.
Affordance is a term of art coined by Gibson meaning “something that refers to both the
environment and the animal” (Gibson, 2015: 119). Although affordances have a base in the physical
structure of environmental objects, they are individuated in relation to the animal’s possibilities for
action. Affordances and possibilities for actions complement each other. A flat, sufficiently extended
and rigid surface on the ground affords support and locomotion to animals like us. If a similar
surface is knee-high above the ground, then it affords sitting on. In all these cases, what the object
affords depends on the features of the objects.  Whether a surface can be sat upon depends on its
height.  At the same time, it  depends on the animal in question,  what width or height precisely
constitutes  an  affordance.  The  proper  scale  to  measure  an  affordance  must  be  “relative  to  the
animal” (Gibson, 2015: 120). A stub that affords sitting on to a child may not do so to an adult. As
such, affordances “are relational in nature” (Heft, 1989: 6).
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To what feature of the animal an affordance is related? This is a matter of debate between
ecological  psychologists.  We find in  the literature at  least  three responses  to  this  question:  the
animal’s possibilities for action might be cashed out in terms of body-scale properties, in terms of
dispositions, or in terms of abilities. I will explore the first and the third proposals.10
In  a  classical  experimental  study,  William  Warren  suggests  that  stairs  are  perceived  as
climbable based on the ratio between the leg length and the riser height (Warren, 1984). Varying the
riser  height,  the  optimal  point  can  be  measured,  in  relation  to  a  person,  for  the  climb-on-able
affordance—that is, a climbing situation of minimum energy expenditure. If the riser height is too
low, it’s better to walk, if it’s too high, it’s better to shift to a quadrupedal gait (1984: 686). Between
these extremes, Warren claims, we find the optimal point for the climb-on-able affordance, which
can be expressed by a ratio between the leg length and the riser height. This explains why the same
stair-step can be perceived as climbable by an adult, but not by a child.
Although the possibility of climbing certainly bears on the ratio between riser height and leg
length, it may be questioned whether the latter explains the former completely. It would not be a
surprise if two persons with the same leg length but very different physical conditioning did not
agree as to whether a stair-step affords climbing. More recently, Warren’s study was questioned by
Cesari, Formenti, and Olivato (2003). Indeed, Warren’s study was limited to young adults and could
not be generalized to other populations.  In their new study, Cesari et al (Cesari et al., 2003: 113)
proposed to show that people of different ages and different motor skills perceive stair-climbing
affordances as the ratio between the riser height and the distance taken from the feet to the bottom
edge  of  the  stair.  According  to  Chemero’s  interpretation  of  that  study,  this  means  that  the
fundamental feature in the individual for that affordance relation is the stepping ability, since the
distance  taken  from  the  stair  depends  on  the  level  of  flexibility  expressed  by  the  individual
(Chemero, 2009: 143–4). As the results of the study showed, the distances taken by older adults,
who are less flexible, vary less in relation to risers of different height than those taken by young
adults. It seems then that older and young adults are perceiving the ratio between riser height and
the distance taken from the stair, which is the aspect of the environment determining climbability, in
terms of their stepping ability. 
As we are trying to understand and explain the notion of possibilities for actions by which
affordances are perceived, it is reasonable that they cannot be explained completely by properties of
the body. The physical possibilities of the body are too broad to understand the possibilities for
action. Many possible physical states of the body are not possible actions in any sense. Therefore,
10 For a presentation and discussion of the second proposal, see Turvey (1992).
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reducing the possible physical states of the body to those that are possible manifestations of the
animal’s abilities is a welcome clarification of the notion of possibilities for action. Abilities are
irreducible to body physical properties, although they may supervene on the latter. In the ecological
approach tradition, Chemero (2003), Heft (1989), and Costall (1995) clearly appeal to this more
broadly construed notion of abilities in their accounts of affordances.
I will not offer in this chapter a metaphysics of abilities, although I recognize that a solid
defense of the ecological approach to perception could benefit from that. What I will do is to offer
some features of the abilities that I think are crucial to a proper understanding of the possibilities for
action. The first point, emphasized by both Chemero (2009: 145) and Heft (1989: 9–10), is that
abilities  are  to  be  taken  as  functions  specifiable  in  relation  to  the  organism’s  survival  and
flourishing. They have history, evolutionary or developmental. What this means is that an ability is
constituted, in the case of an inherit ability, by the interactions of the species with its environment
over many generations and, in the case of a developed ability, by the interactions of the individual
with  its  environment  over  time.  Each  loop  in  such history  of  interactions  selects  a  behavioral
response better fitted to the organism’s survival and flourishing than the past ones. This history of
continuous  interactions  aiming  at  the  organism’s  survival  and  flourishing  is  the  key  to
understanding a second fundamental feature of abilities, its relation to intentionality. Abilities, in the
organism,  are  what  keep  the  organism  adjusted  to  its  environment,  while  affordances,  in  the
environment, are what keep the environment affordable to organisms. Such power of adjustment,
acquired by that history of continuous interactions of exploration, manipulation, and transformation
of  the  environment,  is  the  locus  of  our  more  primitive  intentionality.  Rowlands  coined  the
expression revealing activity to capture this point. “Intentional directedness toward the world,” he
claims, “is best understood as revealing activity” (Rowlands, 2010: 163) and, I would emphasize, as
history of revealing activity. The idea indeed is very mundane. An organism that has the power to
keep  its  adjustment  to  certain  features  of  the  environment,  sustaining  then  its  survival  and
flourishing, is an organism able to act in relation to those features, with more or less success. Thus,
it  is  an  organism whose  abilities  manifest,  when exercised,  intentional  directedness  toward  the
world. History of interactions, of revealing activity, is crucial since an organism depends on it to
acquire and maintain an ability to intentionally direct toward some feature of the environment. 
Possibilities for action, then, are the set of actions that can be manifested by the organism’s
abilities, at least those abilities that, by virtue of a history of interactions and revealing activity, have
intentional powers. Our body can express intentional acts not by virtue of its physical properties or
its dispositions, but by virtue of its abilities. As affordances are related to abilities in the animal,
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they have meaning for the animal  in  the sense that  they offer possibilities for  actions  that  are
relevant for its needs and plans. Therefore, action is much more than just mechanical behavior; it is
infused by intentionality. These abilities are in operation in the perception of affordances. Invariants
in the stimulus flux are picked up by a perceptual system in a body prepared for them in terms of
possibilities for action.  Therefore,  the notion of ability is central  also to the explanation of the
perception of affordances. As we will see in the next section, “the extension of affordances to the
culturally based meanings of objects,” what may be called  social affordances, “is justified if we
view affordances in relation to what an individual can do, or rather what an individual knows how
to do” (Heft, 1989: 18). That is, abilities is the key notion in order to socially extend the notion of
affordance.
To return to a question that I have left partially unsettled in the second section, the process
of habituation to an instrument is just a special case of acquiring or learning an ability. The history
of interactions between a blind person using a cane and the environment, in order to adjust and
control his behavior while aiming at the successful locomotion, explains not only the emergence in
his stimulus flux of recurrent patterns of information related to the form and texture of the surfaces
touched by the cane, but also his ability to attend to these surface properties instead of to the bodily
feelings in his hand and skin. An animal ability resonates through whatever was used by the animal
to  explore,  manipulate,  and transform its  environment.  For  that  same reason,  the  intentionality
disclosed by the acquisition of an ability travels to that very part of the environment in relation to
which the animal has become able to keep in tune.
Intentionality is revealing activity, and this activity takes place, in part, in the
cane  (and  in  the  brain  and  in  the  body,  etc.).  The  cane  can  with  as  much
justification  be  regarded  as  the  (partial)  locus  of  the  blind  man's  revealing
activity as his brain. The nature of the blind person's revealing activity is that it
travels through his brain, through his body, through his cane, out into the world
itself. (Rowlands, 2010: 201)
5. Social affordances 
Gibson was not opposed to socially extending the notion of affordance; he even gave many
examples of social affordances. He mentions, for example, the postbox that “affords letter-mailing
to a letter-writing human in a community with a postal system” (2015: 130). Places for hiding,
places that afford concealment, require that the animal perceives them as safe in relation to what
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other animals afford, what they can do. So the notion of hiding affordance brings forth issues of
social  perception,  as  Gibson  recognizes  (2015:  128).  As  other  animals  and  persons  are  in  the
environment interacting with each other all the time, it is to be expected that “the other animal and
the other person provide mutual and reciprocal affordances at extremely high levels of behavioral
complexity” (2015: 129). As Gibson points out, “behavior affords behavior” (2015: 127). Sexual
behaviors and nurturing behaviors all depend on the perception of what other animals afford or can
do. 
When one talks about social  affordances, one may mean two different,  although related,
things. As in the case of the postbox, it may mean that the affordance relation of letter-mailing is
available only to subjects of a certain social group. That is, the perception of a certain affordance of
the postbox depends on participating in a social practice that gives support to certain affordances of
the postbox. In this sense, the letter-mailing affordance is social in nature; it is constitutively related
to a social  practice.  Persons outside this  group will  not perceive the postbox as offering letter-
mailing. A second sense of the notion of social affordance is specifically related to affordances of
animate beings. To perceive what an animal or a person can do, that is, to perceive what they afford
as animate beings, is to perceive their minds in some way. The issue here is whether we can “have a
direct perceptual grasp of the other person’s intentions, feelings, etc.” (Gallagher, 2008: 535). The
social  dimension of these affordances  has to  do with the possibilities for actions related to  the
perception  of  other  person’s  mental  states  and  actions.  It  is  appropriate  to  talk  about  social
affordances in the sense that in the ecological approach some of the other person’s mental states and
actions are perceived in terms of what she affords, what possibilities for interactions an animate
being offers.11 This sense of  social affordance is in some respect more fundamental than the first
one,  since the participation in a social  practice,  which may socially shape the affordances of a
physical  object,  as  in  the  case  of  the  postbox,  depends  on  one’s  ability  to  perceive  others  as
affording interaction and collaboration.
If we can have revealing activity by interacting cooperatively with others, and if this activity
is driven by the perception of what others afford, then our minds are socially extended—that is, our
minds extend to  the social  environment.  Those activities  performed in cooperation  with  others
constitute cognitive processes by which information present in the environment is transformed in
available  information to  the organisms involved in  solving  a  task cooperatively.  Therefore,  the
possibility of social affordances in the second sense is crucial for defending the socially extended
11 For more discussion on the first sense of social affordance, see Costall (1995) and Martens and Schlicht (2017)
for a detailed explanation of the second sense. 
13
mind thesis. To claim the truth of that thesis, not all cognitive processes need to be so constituted; it
is sufficient that some are.
Situations  involving  joint  attention  are  rich  for  exploring  the  phenomenon  of  social
affordance. The activity of joint attention follows a specific pattern of behavior, involving detecting
a  gaze,  following  its  direction  (sometimes  more  than  once  if  nothing  interesting  is  found),
establishing eye contact, and further following the direction of the gaze. Two or more observers
engage in joint attention when they are simultaneously aware of the same region or object in the
environment  and  of  the  other’s  attention  in  the  direction  of  that  region  or  object.12 The  latter
awareness  is  necessary  for  social  cognition,  since  it  affords  the  behaviors  of  competition  or
cooperation.  That  is,  the  animal  engaged  in  joint  attention  perceives  the  other’s  attention  as
opportunities for certain kinds of behavior. For instance, “the perception that another individual
attends to the same focus as ourselves makes possible social affordances such as outnumbering our
foe”  (Shepherd  &  Cappuccio,  2011:  206),  which  controls  the  cooperative  behavior  of  mutual
defense against a predator. Joint attention is a social ability from the beginning. It enables animals
to coordinate their behavior with one another to sustain group cohesion, exchange information, and
negotiate alliances. There are variations between species as to what behaviors following the gaze
and joint attention afford. For instance, there is evidence that in some primates, “the gaze following
behaviors is modulated by the social relevance of the cue” (Shepherd & Cappuccio, 2011: 211).
Since joint attention affords possibilities for cooperation between those engaged in such activity, it
involves social affordances in the second sense of the term by default.
Infants from nine to twelve months of life start  to engage in activities of joint attention
(Shepherd  &  Cappuccio,  2011:  211).  At  this  age,  infants  constantly  check  the  eyes  of  their
caregivers and join in mutual gaze. These activities of joint attention happen to be very useful in
situations of social learning. Let’s take the case of the perception of a cliff in order to see a case of
social  affordance in  the first  sense of the term. Normally,  since a cliff  affords falling off,  it  is
dangerous to us and it looks dangerous to many animals and infants. Some classical experiments
using a visual cliff show that cliffs are in fact easily perceived as dangerous. Visual cliff is an
apparatus built with a platform. A piece of glass is placed on top of the platform and extends well
off of the platform. At the edge of the platform, it will continue to look dangerous, since the cliff is
still visible. But it is safe, since the glass affords support. However, “when human infants at the
12 Shepherd and Cappuccio distinguish between  nonrepresentational joint  attention, which many animals can
manifest, from “full-blooded” joint attention, which only humans manifest. The latter, but not the former, requires the
representation of a common ground, the shared goal of the observers engaged in joint attention. In the former case, the
joint attention can afford cooperation without the observers representing a shared goal. As the authors emphasize, “I can
cooperate, taking that individual’s side in a conflict while he or she is unaware that I’m behind him or her, threatening
his or her foe” (2011: 206).
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crawling stage of locomotion were tested with this apparatus, many of them would pat the glass
with their hands but would not venture out on the surface” (Gibson, 2015: 133). The information in
the optic flux is sufficient to specify the cliff. The infant normally picks up this information without
the help of others and stops at the edge of the cliff. Her behavior is controlled by the affordance of
falling off. In another study, Sorce et al. used a modified visual cliff, which allows for varying its
depth, in order to produce situations of ambiguous information in which it is unclear whether the
cliff affords falling off. The aim is to test whether “the infant looks to the face of another in order to
search for emotional information to help appraise or evaluate the ambiguity” (Sorce et al., 1985:
196). As the results show the behavior of the infant is controlled by the emotional information
available. When the infant approaches the border of the cliff, she tries to establish joint attention
with the caregiver to look for relevant information in the face expression of the latter. In the first
test, the caregiver signaled a fearful expression, and none of the infants ventured across the edge of
the cliff.  In a second test,  the caregiver  signaled a  happy face,  and the majority  of the infants
crossed  the  edge  of  the  cliff.  Therefore,  the  emotion  signaled  by  the  caregiver  significantly
influenced the infants’ perception and consequently their behavior. 
This  is  a  clear  case  of  social  affordance,  in  both  senses  of  the  term.  First,  the  infant’s
perception of what the cliff affords, in the situation of ambiguous information, is in part shaped by
the cooperative interaction afforded by the joint attention established between the infant and the
caregiver. Second, by engaging in joint attention activity directed to the cliff, the caregiver affords
cooperative behavior of a special kind. Her facial expressions, which in other context would mean
very different things, offer to the infant the behavior of crossing or standing still. The infant then
modulates her behavior according to what the face of the caregiver affords. In this situation, the
infant’s  perception  of  what  the  cliff  affords  is  socially  modulated.  Information  present  in  the
environment, but only partially available in the stimulus flux of the infant, is turned completely
available to the infant through this  cooperative activity.  Thus, from less than one year old,  our
minds are already socially extended. 
6. Concluding Remarks
The extended mind thesis claims that some cognitive processes of an organism are in part
constituted by actions of that organism in that information necessary to perform a task becomes
available  to  the  organism  through  its  manipulation,  exploration  and  transformation  of  the
environment. We saw how Gibson’s ecological approach to perception allows to understand the way
in which the organism offloads onto the environment part of a cognitive process. Its interactions
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with the environment bring about patterned and ordered stimuli over time. Such inflow of stimulus
contains  the  relevant  environmental  information  which  the  organism  perceives  in  terms  of
affordances, that is, possibilities for actions. In a case of ambiguous stimuli, as in the situation of
the modified visual cliff discussed in the former section, it’s possible that interactions with other
organisms can help to disambiguate them. In this sense, behaviors afforded by joint attention, which
are a kind of social action, can shape the perception of the affordances of a cliff. This being the
case, the mind is socially extended as well, at least some perceptual processes are.
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